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Religion is commonly defined as a set of rules, developed as part of a culture. Here we pro-
vide evidence that practice in following these rules systematically changes the way people
attend to visual stimuli, as indicated by the individual sizes of the global precedence effect
(better performance to global than to local features). We show that this effect is signifi-
cantly reduced in Calvinism, a religion emphasizing individual responsibility, and
increased in Catholicism and Judaism, religions emphasizing social solidarity. We also
show that this effect is long-lasting (still affecting baptized atheists) and that its size sys-
tematically varies as a function of the amount and strictness of religious practices. These
findings suggest that religious practice induces particular cognitive-control styles that
induce chronic, directional biases in the control of visual attention.
 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
One way or another, religion plays an important role in
our lives—be it as active believers, as targets or victims of
religiously motivated actions, or as interested observers
of conflicts nurtured by differing religious convictions.
Here we provide evidence that this impact may be more
fundamental than commonly assumed, namely, that reli-
gious practice may affect basic perceptual processes in
such a way that followers of different religions literally
see the same things differently.
Religion is commonly defined as a set of (implicit and/or
explicit) rules, developed as part of a culture, which gives. All rights reserved.
rsity, Department of
55, 2300 RB Leiden,
olzato).followers the experience that their life is meaningful. It
can be considered a sort of framework that shapes a fol-
lower’s life and thoughts, and determines the way he or
she creates and formulates beliefs, and experiences rules
and feelings (Lindbeck, 1984). That cultural experience in
a broader sense might affect our perception and attention
has been suggested by studies on cultural differences. For
instance, Masuda and Nisbett (2001) observed that people
growing up in Asian cultures exhibit a more holistic per-
ceptual style (i.e., are more responsive to the global than
to local features of visual objects or scenes) than people
growing up in the North-American culture. Westerners
seem to focus on salient objects while East Asians attend
more to the relationships between objects and background
elements or context (Nisbett & Masuda, 2003; Nisbett &
Miyamoto, 2005). This fits with the observation that East
Asians allocate their attention more broadly than
Americans do (Boduroglu, Shah, & Nisbett, 2009) and
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colleagues (1954) that social interdependence is associated
with a more holistic processing style.
Researchers attribute these differences to culturally
guided learning experience. The idea is that Western cul-
tures often emphasize the individual and individual goals
and needs, whereas Eastern Asian cultures emphasize the
importance of the group and the social embedding (Nisbett
& Miyamoto, 2005). These different foci are likely to be
transmitted to new members of the culture through cul-
tural learning, that is, by providing selective reward for re-
sponses and actions that reflect culturally important
values. This view is consistent with evidence that holistic
and analytic perceptual styles can be experimentally in-
duced by having people perform tasks that draw attention
to either personal interdependence (by letting the partici-
pants marking relational pronouns as ‘‘our” and ‘‘we”) or
independence (by having them to circle pronouns referring
to the self as ‘‘my” and ‘‘I”) (Kühnen & Oyserman, 2002).
Electrophysiological findings suggest that a bias to attend
to the global context versus local details affects the pro-
cessing of visual features rather early in the processing
stream. In particular, after marking independent pronouns,
participants produced an enlarged P1 amplitude to local
than global targets in a global–local task (where they had
to react to large shapes made of small shapes: see Navon,
1977) at lateral occipital electrodes (i.e., in the visual cor-
tex), whereas marking interdependent pronouns had the
opposite effect (Lin, Lin, & Han, 2008).
Even though culture is certainly an important determi-
nant of interindividual differences, cultural context is very
hard to capture and to define, which makes investigations
that go beyond the available, rather coarse comparisons
between Eastern and Western cultures extremely difficult.
For instance, many inter-cultural comparisons of what are
considered ‘‘Western” and ‘‘Eastern-Asian” cultures have
evaluated US Americans in relation to Japanese. US Amer-
icans are composed of various cultural and national back-
grounds, ranging from countries with particularly
individualistic cultures, like the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands, to countries with a particularly strong
emphasis on collectivism, such as Greece and Mexico (cf.,
Hofstede, 2001). Japan, in contrast, is one of the Asian
countries with the most individualistic culture. Thus it
seems difficult to capture the essence of a culture by study-
ing citizens of a particular country (which often live and
represent different cultures) and to generalize from one
country to its regional neighbors (e.g., to China, which is
considered much more collectivistic than Japan; cf., Hofst-
ede, 2001; Oyserman, Coon & Kemmelmeier, 2002). In the
absence of an unequivocal and straightforward definition
of what a culture is and what it implies, it is difficult to de-
rive clear-cut predictions of how culture might affect hu-
man cognition.
Social systems that seem to be better suited for that
purpose are religious systems or, for short, religions. Reli-
gions are typically rather well pre- and described in (often
sacred) writings (notwithstanding important exceptions,
as Buddhism) and relived in specific, widely shared prac-
tices and rituals; even different streams and subgroups
can often be straightforwardly identified and defined rela-tive to each other. Very recently, McCullough and Wil-
loughby (2009) argued that, because religious people
have considerable practice in learning and following rules,
they are less likely to commit crimes in general. That is, the
fact that individuals receive training in following rules may
generalize beyond the particular rules being practiced.
Along the same lines, Hommel and Colzato (in press) have
speculated that religious training may induce particular
cognitive-control strategies and establish default control
parameters that generalize to situations that have no bear-
ing for religious beliefs. For instance, continuously focusing
on the individual rather than the social context might in-
duce a chronic attentional-control bias towards local, and
away from global features of people’s behavior, events,
and objects.
Preliminary evidence suggesting that religion affects
attention and perception of their followers has been pro-
vided by Colzato, van den Wildenberg, and Hommel
(2008). This study compared Dutch neo-Calvinists (follow-
ers) and atheists (non followers) brought up and living in
the same country (the Netherlands, where the dominant
culture is influenced by Calvinism) with respect to their
attentional biases. Colzato et al. employed the same glo-
bal–local task (Navon, 1977) that was used in many cul-
tural studies and presented participants with a large
rectangle or square made of either smaller rectangles or
squares. Participants were to react to either the global or
the local shape in different blocks of trials. Both neo-Cal-
vinists and atheists recognized the global shape faster than
the local shapes, thus producing the well-known global
precedence effect (i.e., people see the forest before the
trees: Navon, 1977). However, Calvinists showed a signifi-
cantly less pronounced global precedence effect than
atheists.
As Colzato et al. pointed out, Dutch neo-Calvinism is
based on the concept of sphere sovereignty propagated by
the former Dutch Prime Minister Abraham Kuyper (Bratt,
1998). This concept emphasizes that each sphere or sector
of life has its own responsibilities and authority, and
stands equal to other spheres. Other sectors than one’s
own are not to be judged or considered, but basically to
be left alone. The widespread application of this concept
has led to a profound segregation (‘‘pillarization”) of Dutch
society and established the idea that, in a nutshell, every-
one should ‘‘mind his or her own business”. Among other
things, this idea of segregation as strength has led to a
rather liberal policy regarding drug use, abortion, or eutha-
nasia, but it also provided the theoretical basis for Apart-
heid ideology in South Africa (Boesak, 1984). To teach
children and other new members of the neo-Calvinist tra-
dition the ‘‘rules of the game”, so Colzato et al. (2008) spec-
ulated, selective reward must have provided for behavior
that reflects appropriate application of those rules. This,
among other things may have led neo-Calvinists to chron-
ically bias local attention, compared to the atheists.
The observations of Colzato et al. (2008) provide preli-
minary evidence that following a set of religious rules
might indeed systematically change the way people attend
to and process visual events. At the same time, they fail to
demonstrate that this bias really is chronic, strictly tied to
rule-following practice, and really reflecting the particular
L.S. Colzato et al. / Cognition 117 (2010) 87–94 89religious practice being followed rather than religiousness
in general. The present two studies aimed at filling this
theoretical gap. To test whether the hypothetical reli-
gion-induced bias is indeed chronic, we studied how
long-lasting religion-related differences in processing glo-
bal versus local features are and whether they continue
to exist in the absence of practice, as in the case of baptized
atheists—people who were regularly baptized but stopped
believing during puberty. To test whether the bias may be
modulated by the strictness to religious rules, we also
tested whether the effect of religion on visual attention is
proportional to the strength of belief, as expressed in dif-
ferent variants of neo-Calvinism. Finally, we tested the
specificity of the religion-related attentional bias by com-
paring Roman Catholics in Italy (where the dominant cul-
ture is penetrated by Catholicism) and Orthodox Jews in
Israel (where the dominant culture is instead permeated
by Judaism), with seculars growing up in the same cul-
tures. Given that in Roman Catholicism and Judaism the
rules have a much stronger emphasis on social solidarity
than in neo-Calvinism (which emphasizes individual
responsibility instead; see Cohen & Hill, 2007), we ex-
pected that Catholics and Orthodox Jews would show a
greater global precedence effect than seculars do.2. Study 1
The purpose of Study 1 was twofold. First, we investi-
gated how long-lasting the effect of religion on visual
attention is by comparing Dutch conservative neo-Calvin-
ists, baptized atheists (formerly conservative Calvinists),
and ‘‘true” (i.e., non-baptized) atheists, brought up in the
same country and in the same cultural setting, with respect
to the way they attend to and process global and local fea-
tures of visual stimuli (as diagnosed by the global–local
task (Navon, 1977). If religious practice would really in-
duce a chronic attentional bias, one would expect at least
some after-effect of such practice in baptized atheists.
Accordingly, we expected a significantly less pronouncedTable 1
Demographic characteristics and religious behavior of participants, and performa
presented in parentheses.
Variables (SD) Conservative Calvinists Lib
Sample N (M:F) 18 (8:10) 18
Age (years) 21.2 (2.6) 21.
Raven IQ 112.7 (3.6) 112
Baptized (or similar)** 18 (0) 18
Daily prayers** 5.6 (1.5) 3.7
Weekly church visit** 2.0 (0) 1.8
Age of leaving church 0 (0) 0 (0
Global targets
Reaction times (ms) 355 (10.5) 344
Error rates (%) 5.9 (1.7) 5.9
Local targets
Reaction times (ms) 411 (10.9) 418
Error rates (%) 8.7 (1.7) 10.
Global precedence
Reaction times (ms)** 56 74
Error rates (%) 2.8 4.3
*p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.global precedence effect in baptized than in non-baptized
atheists. Second, we investigated whether this reduction
of the global precedence effect is proportional to the
strength of belief, that is, to the amount of religious prac-
tice. To do so, we compared the conservative neo-Calvin-
ists and non-baptized atheists with liberal neo-Calvinists
from a religious community that follows less strict reli-
gious rules than conservative neo-Calvinists do. If the
attentional bias is a function of the amount and strictness
of religious practice, the global precedence effect should be
less pronounced in conservative than in Liberal Calvinists.
2.1. Methods
2.1.1. Participants
We tested 72 young healthy adults, who participated
for partial fulfillment of course credit or a financial reward.
They constituted four experimental groups with 18 partic-
ipants each: Conservative Calvinists (all members of the
‘‘Gereformeerde Gemeenten” of the Calvinistic corps of Lei-
den University), Liberal Calvinists (all members of the
‘‘Gereformeerde Vrijgemaakt” Church of Gouda), atheists
(non-baptized) and baptized atheists (former members of
the ‘‘Gereformeerde Gemeenten” Church). All participants
were matched for ethnicity (100% Caucasian), Culture
(100% Dutch), age, sex, and IQ (measured by Raven’s Stan-
dard Progressive Matrices)—see Table 1 for demographic
data and religious behavior. All groups were educated in
the Netherlands following the same educational style and
institutional type (VWO), and reported similar social–eco-
nomical background. Written informed consent was ob-
tained from all participants after the nature of the study
was explained to them; the protocol and the remuneration
arrangements of 10 Euro was approved by the institutional
review board (Leiden University, Institute for Psychological
Research).
2.1.2. Apparatus and stimuli
Responses were made by pressing the ‘‘Z” or ‘‘?” of the
QWERTY computer keyboard with the left and right indexnce on globally and locally defined targets in Study 1. Standard errors are
eral Calvinists Baptized atheists Atheists
(9:9) 18 (8:10) 18 (7:11)
7 (3.7) 22.4 (3.0) 22.1 (3.3)
.9 (3.85) 112.3 (4.2) 114.7 (3.4)
(0) 18 (0) 0 (0)
(2.1) 0 (0) 0 (0)
(0.4) 0 (0) 0 (0)
) 15.3 (1.5) 0 (0)
(10.5) 362 (10.5) 350 (10.5)
(1.7) 4.6 (1.7) 6.1 (1.7)
(10.9) 421 (10.9) 443 (10.9)
2 (1.7) 9.7 (1.7) 10.4 (1.7)
59 93
5.1 4.3
Fig. 1. Mean global precedence effect for atheists, Liberal Calvinists,
Conservative Calvinists and baptized atheists. Vertical capped lines atop
bars indicate standard error of the mean.
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Huizinga, Dolan, and Van der Molen (2006), and consisted
of geometric figures. Larger (global) rectangles or squares
consisted of smaller (local) rectangles or squares. Global
stimuli (i.e., squares or rectangles; 93  93 pixels or
93  189 pixels respectively) were composed of many
smaller ‘‘local” stimuli (i.e., squares or rectangles;
21  21 pixels or 8  46 pixels respectively). The space be-
tween the local elements of a stimulus was 3 pixels. A glo-
bal square consisted of 16 small squares or eight small
rectangles; a global rectangle consisted of 32 small squares
or 16 small rectangles.
2.1.3. Task and procedure
Participants responded to randomly presented rectan-
gles or squares by pressing a left or right response button,
respectively. They responded to the global shape in one
block and to the local in another; block order was random-
ized and each block comprised of 30 practice trials and 100
experimental trials. A cue indicated to which dimension
(global or local) the participants should respond. Cues that
signaled the global (local) dimension consisted of a large
(small) square, presented at one side of the target stimulus,
and a large (small) rectangle, presented at the other side of
the target stimulus. The color of cues and target was red.
They remained on the screen until a response was given
or 3500 ms had passed. The time interval between presen-
tation of the cue and of the target stimulus was 500 ms.
The interval between the response and the presentation
of the cue was fixed at 1000 ms.
All participants were tested individually and completed
the intelligence test and the global–local task. Individual IQ
was determined by means of a 30-min reasoning-based
intelligence test (Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices:
SPM, Raven, Court, & Raven, 1988). The SPM assesses the
individual’s ability to create perceptual relations and to
reason by analogy independent of language and formal
schooling; it is a standard, widely-used test to measure
Spearman’s g factor and of fluid intelligence in particular.
2.2. Statistical analysis
Univariate ANOVAs were performed to test age and IQ
differences between the groups. Following Colzato et al.
(2008) and Huizinga et al. (2006), median reaction times
and square root error percentages were analyzed by means
of ANOVAs using Target Level (global vs. local) as within-
and Group as between-participants factor. We only consid-
ered data from where local and global information differed.
A significance level of p = .05 was adopted for all tests.
2.3. Results and Discussion
No significant group differences were obtained for age,
intelligence, or sex, Fs(3, 71) < 1. The reaction time analysis
showed a main effect of Target Level, F(1, 68) = 331.57,
p < .0001, MSE = 331.568, g2p = 0.89, which was modified
by Group, F(3, 68) = 7.75, p < .0001, MSE = 331.568,
g2p = 0.25. All groups showed a significant main effect of
Target Level, F(1, 17) = 155.96, p < .0001, MSE = 504.772,
g2p = 0.90; F(1, 17) = 135.14, p < .0001, MSE = 231.792,g2p = 0.89; F(1, 17) = 138.54, p < .0001, MSE = 209.838,
g2p = 0.89; F(1, 17) = 127.70, p < .0001, MSE = 379.871,
g2p = 0.88, for atheists, baptized atheists, Conservative Cal-
vinists and Liberal Calvinists, respectively. For all groups
the main effect indicated global precedence (Navon,
1977): Global targets were responded to faster than local
targets. Moreover, the size of this effect varied with Group.
Replicating earlier findings (Colzato et al., 2008), Conserva-
tive Calvinists showed the smallest global precedence ef-
fect, followed by Liberal Calvinists, baptized atheists and
atheists (see Table 1 and Fig. 1).
t-Tests for the obtained global precedence effects
showed that baptized atheists differed significantly from
atheists (34 ms), t(34) = 3.81, p < .001, but not from Con-
servative Calvinists (3 ms), t(34) = .32, p > .05, or Liberal
Calvinists, t(34) = 1.74, p > .05. Interestingly, Liberal Cal-
vinists showed a significantly larger precedence effect than
Conservative Calvinists did (18 ms), t(34) = 2.05, p < .05,
and a significantly smaller effect than atheists (19 ms),
t(34) = 2.03, p < .05. Error percentages did not reveal any
reliable effect, Fs(1, 68) < 1.
As expected, our findings suggest that the effect of reli-
gion is not a temporary by-product of ongoing religious
practice but a long-lasting, chronic bias of visual attention.
Interestingly, the performance of baptized atheists was not
reliably different from Conservative Calvinists, suggesting
that more than seven years of non-practice were insuffi-
cient to even reduce the acquired bias. Our observations
also suggest that attentional biases are a (probably contin-
uous) function of the amount and strictness of religious
practices.3. Study 2
Up to now all observations regarding the relationship
between religion and attention demonstrate a reduction
of the global precedence effect. This might suggest that
religious practice necessarily emphasizes attention to de-
tails, perhaps because believers are trained to distinguish
between superficially similar situations that however call
for the application of different rules suggested by their
L.S. Colzato et al. / Cognition 117 (2010) 87–94 91belief. Another possibility is that other type of religions,
which are related to different set of rules, may bias atten-
tion and perception in different directions. If the type of
bias acquired would really reflect the rules expressed in,
and learned by means of the particular type of practice, it
should be possible to demonstrate an increased prece-
dence effect for religions that emphasize the community
and the social context rather than the individual. To share
this emphasis, so we would argue, requires attentional
training that takes global features into account. This ‘‘rule”
should induce stronger support of the global features of
stimuli and, thus, lead to a stronger precedence effect.
Two religions that put much more emphasis on the so-
cial solidarity and context than Calvinism (and other Prot-
estant religions) does are Roman Catholicism (cf., John
Paul, 1987) and Judaism (Hart, 2000). This different
emphasis is obvious from the most basic practice of living
these religions: Whereas Protestant believers are encour-
aged and actually expected to engage in direct dialog with
God (a process that Luther aimed to facilitate by translat-
ing the Bible from Latin), Catholics and Jews mainly com-
municate with God more indirectly, through socially
shared prayers and religious rituals guided by dedicated
mediators (priests, rabbis). Numerous authors since de
Tocqueville (1835) and Weber (1930) have considered that
the much stronger emphasis on individualism in Protes-
tant religions have systematically biased both individual
cognition and political preference, which among other
things is likely to have shaped the political constitution
of the United States of America and facilitated the emer-
gence of capitalism (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, &
Tipton, 1985). Other authors have emphasized, and pro-
vided empirical evidence that Catholicism and Judaism
propagate collectivism. For instance, Farias and Lalljee
(2008) found that Roman Catholics adopt a more collectiv-
istic outlook than atheist/agnostic participants on a battery
of social–psychological measures, including values, self-
concepts, and individualism/collectivism scales. Along the
same lines, strongly religious (Jewish) high school students
in Israel have been shown to score higher on several collec-
tivism measures than their secular fellow students (Ichilov,
2005; Sagy, Orr, & Bar-On, 1999).
Direct comparisons across religions have provided more
evidence for systematic cognitive differences between
Protestants on the one hand and Catholics and Jews on
the other. For instance, Protestants see their membership
to their religion as an ‘‘assent”, whereas Catholics and Jews
see their religious identity as due to biological descent (i.e.,
they are Catholics or Jews because their parents were) (Co-
hen & Hill, 2007). Moreover, Protestants have a decidedly
internal locus of control (Sue & Sue, 1990) and consider
their belief the major means to control destiny (Falicov,
2001), while Catholics have an external locus of control
and tend to see God, fate, or destiny being in charge for
their life. With respect to Allport and Ross’ (1967) motiva-
tional approach, the religious motivation of Protestants can
be characterized more as ‘‘intrinsic” (‘‘I try hard to carry
my religion over into all my other dealings in life”),
whereas the religious practice of Catholics and Jews is
more ‘‘extrinsically” motivated (‘‘it doesn’t matter so much
what I believe as long as I lead a moral life”, Cohen & Hill,2007). In other words, Protestantism is more affecting
one’s internal thoughts while Catholicism and Judaism
seem to target the social implications of one’s actions.
The latter is likely to require the consideration of a broader
range of stimuli (e.g., other people and their responses) for
the control of appropriate action—a broader attentional fo-
cus that is. Indeed, Dershowitz (1971) found that Orthodox
Jewish boys were more field dependent than were secular
Jewish boys, who in turn were more field dependent than
Protestant boys. With respect to the global–local task em-
ployed in Study 1, there are thus reasons to expect that
Catholics and Jews would show a greater global prece-
dence effect than secular participants from an otherwise
comparable cultural context.
As Dutch culture is penetrated by Calvinism, so are Ital-
ian and Israeli cultures permeated by Catholicism and
Judaism—which is why we conducted our second study
in Italy and Israel, respectively. To test whether other reli-
gions, which are related to different set of rules, may bias
attention and perception in different direction (increasing
instead of decreasing the size of the global precedence ef-
fect), we compared Roman Catholics in Italy and Orthodox
Jews in Israel, with culture-matched seculars. Given that in
Roman Catholicism and Judaism the rules have a much
stronger emphasis on social solidarity than neo-Calvinism
has, we expected Catholics and Orthodox Jews to show a
greater global precedence effect than seculars.
3.1. Methods
Seventy-two young healthy adults (36 Italians tested in
Bologna, Italy, and 36 Israelis tested in Beer-Sheva, Israel)
were compensated for their collaboration and constituted
the four groups of 18 participants each: Italian Roman
Catholics and Italian Seculars (people who grew up in a laic
environment) and Israeli Orthodox Jews and Israeli Secu-
lars. As in Study 1, all participants were matched for eth-
nicity, culture, age, and IQ—see Table 2 for demographic
data and religious behavior. All Italian and Israeli partici-
pants were educated in the country they lived in, were ex-
posed to the same educational style and institutional type,
and reported similar social–economical background. Writ-
ten informed consent was obtained from all participants
after the nature of the study was explained to them; the
protocol and the remuneration arrangements of five Euro
(Italian participants) and of 40 Shekels (Israeli partici-
pants) or course credits were approved by the respective
institutional review board. The remaining procedure was
as Study 1.
3.2. Results and discussion
3.2.1. Roman Catholics vs. Seculars
No significant group differences were obtained for age,
t = 0.89, p > .05, or intelligence, t = 1.53, p > .05. The reac-
tion time analysis showed a main effect of Target Level,
F(1, 34) = 42.86, p < . 0001, MSE = 871.985, g2p = 0.56, indi-
cating that participants responded faster to global than lo-
cal targets. This effect was modified by Group,
F(1, 34) = 5.42, p < .05, MSE = 871.985, g2p = 0.14. As
expected, Roman Catholics exhibited a more pronounced
Table 2
Demographic characteristics and religious behavior of participants, and performance on globally and locally defined targets in Study 2. Standard errors are
presented in parentheses.
Variables (SD) Italian Israelian
Roman Catholics Seculars Orthodox Jews Seculars
Sample N (M:F) 18 (2:16) 18 (5:13) 18 (9:9) 18 (9:9)
Age (years) 20.3 (1.1) 20.3 (1.2) 23.4 (2.1) 24.2 (1.6)
Raven IQ 110.7 (5.2) 113.9 (5.7) 109.6 (4.8) 112.8 (4.6)
Baptized (Yes:No)* 18:0 14:4
Communion (Yes:No)** 18:0 0:18
Daily prays** 0.5 (0.5) 0 (0) 1.7 (0.9) 0 (0)
Kosher food (Yes:No)** 18:0 0:18
Weekly church/synagogue visits** 1.0 (0) 0 (0) 3.0 (2.9) 0 (0)
Global targets
Reaction times (ms) 474 (21.9) 542 (21.9) 378 (12.5) 356 (12.5)
Error rates (%) 3.8 (1.0) 4.2 (1.0) 14.1 (3.3) 10.6 (3.3)
Local targets
Reaction times (ms) 536 (18.7) 571 (18.7) 452 (12.3) 398 (12.3)
Error rates (%) 3.9 (0.9) 3.6 (0.9) 11.0 (2.0) 13.4 (2.0)
Global precedence
Reaction times (ms)** 62 29 74 42
Error rates (%) 0.1 0.6 3.1 2.8
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
Fig. 2. Mean global precedence effect for Roman Catholics and Seculars
(Panel A) and Orthodox Jews and Seculars (Panel B). Vertical capped lines
atop bars indicate standard error of the mean.
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Fig. 2). Error percentages did not reveal any reliable effect,
Fs(1, 34) < 1.
3.2.2. Orthodox Jews vs. Seculars
No significant group differences were obtained for age,
t = 1.40, p > .05, or intelligence, t = 1.60, p > .05. The reac-
tion time analysis showed a main effect of Target Level,
F(1, 34) = 94.52, p < .0001, MSE = 647.993, g2p = 0.73, indi-
cating a global precedence. This effect was modified by
Group, F(1, 34) = 7.56, p < .001, MSE = 647.993, g2p = 0.18.
As is the case of Roman Catholics, Orthodox Jews exhibited
a more pronounced global precedence effect than Seculars
(see Table 2 and Fig. 2). Error percentages did not reveal
any reliable effect, Fs(1, 34) < 1.
The finding that Roman Catholics and Orthodox Jews
show a larger global precedence effect than seculars dem-
onstrates that religion does not necessarily reduce the ef-
fect but seems to modulate its size depending on the
type of religious practice.
4. General discussion
Our findings show that members of different religions,
and atheists, differ specifically and systematically in the
way they attend to the global and local features of visual
stimuli. This effect of religion on visual attention is rela-
tively long-lasting, a matter of degree, and it reflects the
specific religious practice and type of religious set of rules
by either reducing or increasing the global precedence ef-
fect. It goes without saying that Calvinism, Catholicism
and Judaism differ in many ways and many of those differ-
ences may be responsible for the observed variation in the
size of the global precedence effect. And yet, we would ar-
gue that the emphasis on individual responsibility (which
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cessing of events) versus social solidarity (which translates
in stronger emphasis of global features in the processing of
events) is a particularly salient difference that strongly
shapes the behavior of the respective members of these
religious communities. If so, it makes sense to assume that
continuously producing this behavior leads to the acquisi-
tion of particular cognitive-control styles and correspond-
ing control parameters that generalize to attentional
control in religion-unrelated tasks and circumstances
(Colzato et al., 2008; Hommel & Colzato, in press). More-
over, as the groups we investigated were matched for
sex, IQ, age, educational style, cultural background, and
socio-economic situation we can rule out an account of
our results in these terms. Particularly important was the
matching of the age range and educational style: the
global precedence effect seems to be unrelated to general
intelligence but does change with age (Huizinga et al.,
2006).
Given the correlational nature of the observed relation-
ship between religion and attentional bias, it is important
to consider the mechanism underlying this relationship.
Many researchers have favored a unidirectional causal
model of the link between religion and cognition. For in-
stance, Oyserman et al. (2002) review a number of authors
that have attributed North American individualism to the
(mainly) Protestant background of USA’s founding fathers
(and mothers). This suggests that religion is shaping one’s
mind and, considering our present findings, might also bias
one’s attentional preferences. As we have argued, meeting
the expectations of one’s religious community requires
behavior that reflects or at least obeys the rules of the
respective religion. Doing so is likely to induce a bias to-
wards cognitive-control parameters that produce the
wanted behavior. In the case of attentional control this
might imply parameter values related to a rather local fo-
cus with Protestants but values related to a rather global
focus with Catholics and Jews. These biases towards partic-
ular value ranges might become chronic and therefore af-
fect cognitive control even under circumstances that are
not related to religious practice.
Other scenarios are possible, however. For instance, one
may argue that Calvinism is more attractive for people
with a more local attentional bias while Catholicism and
Judaism for people with a more global bias. If so, our find-
ings may reflect mere self-selection. However, people com-
monly join religious groups long before such biases
become obvious (often by birth, following family tradi-
tions, certainly in Italy and Israel), which seems to under-
mine this possibility. Moreover, the wider implication
would be that the distribution of different religions across
the world is a function of pre-existing personality charac-
teristics of their members, which does not seem to fit with
historical facts. For instance, the scattered distribution and
frequent regional switches between different religions in
countries like Germany are a mere reflection of laws that
required inhabitants to share the current religion of their
current sovereign.
A somewhat more realistic possibility would be an
interaction between or co-evolution of traditional cogni-
tive preferences and religion. Even with rather strongly or-ganized religions like Catholicism, the concrete religious
practice is often colored by local habits and pre-religious
or pagan traditions—such as the introduction of the Christ-
mas tree in Catholic and Protestant practice. If we assume
that these habits and traditions are reflecting the cognitive
mindsets of the local people, religious practice and cogni-
tive mindsets might have co-developed, so that religion
would be more an expression of a particular mindset
rather than a logically independent cause in the classical
sense.
A further theoretical alternative would be that both
religious practice and cognitive biases are a function of a
third, not yet identified factor. Even though we did control
for the arguably most obvious factors, there is no way to
rule out other contributions. Even though we can only
speculate what factors that might be, a recent study sug-
gests at least one interesting candidate. As demonstrated
by IJzerman and Semin (2009), people feel closer to each
other when being exposed to a warmer temperature, be
it by a hot (as opposed to cold) drink or by sitting in a
room with higher temperature. Interestingly, Italy and Is-
rael are notoriously ‘‘warm” countries, conditions that in
view of Ijzerman and Semin’s observation might propagate
both more collectivistic religions, like Roman Catholicism
and Judaism, and behavior that takes other people more
into consideration (thus inducing a broader attentional
focus).
Taken altogether, our findings are important and have
implications for at least two different levels of analysis.
First, our observations can be taken to suggest that reli-
gious practice has a measurable and long-lasting impact
on attentional processes. There is no reason to assume that
this kind of impact is restricted to religiously inspired prac-
tice. As implied by Nisbett and Miyamoto (2005), any kind
of practice that reflects particular rules may have the same
potential of inducing systematic biases. This fits with the
already mentioned findings on the impact of Western vs.
East Asian culture on attentional processes, even though
we emphasize that in almost all of the relevant studies reli-
gion was not controlled.
Second, our findings raise a number of wider implica-
tions that relate to the role of belief systems in interper-
sonal and inter-cultural conflict. Our study was not
focused on, and did not reveal any biases towards partic-
ular issues and contents, even though they certainly exist.
However, even a rather abstract bias such as towards lo-
cal vs. global attributes of a perceived event is likely to
cause diverging perceptions, interpretations and, eventu-
ally, conclusions. Very likely, this divergence stands in
the way of effective communication between people with
different religious background, especially if we consider
that religion may impact many more control parameters
than investigated here. As long as we do not have a clear
understanding of what parameters are affected and
exactly how this shapes our cognitive processes, it is
difficult to believe that existing and future misunder-
standings can be resolved or avoided. Accordingly, we
consider the present research as only one of many neces-
sary steps towards a better integration of the different
(e.g., cognitive, social, and cross-cultural) levels of analy-
ses of human behavior.
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